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Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 353
F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Luke Miller, 2L1
Salmon are creatures of habit, especially when it
comes to spawning. Up the same creek or river
they swim until they reach the spot where their
own life began. Humans are habitual as well. We
wait at the mouth of the river where we have
watched the salmon leave their spawning grounds
for the open ocean and proceed to scoop them out
of the water for subsequent sale. In order to per-
petuate this human habit in one particular spot off
the Alaskan coast, a group of commercial fisher-
men joined together and took over a salmon-stock-
ing project once used to study fish stocks in the
wild, and proceeded to turn research into a com-
mercial activity. For years, the number of fish
returning to the ocean remained unnaturally high
providing an adequate harvest for regional fisher-
men because researchers were collecting the eggs
of returning salmon, hatching the eggs in captivity
and releasing half-grown salmon back into the
wild. This was a fairly well designed project except
for one detail - the development of the salmon to
adulthood required the resources of the Kenai
National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska. 
Background
Kenai National Wildlife Refuge has a deep-rooted
past. In 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt set aside
roughly two million acres of Alaska’s Kenai
Peninsula as the Kenai National Moose Range. In
1980, Congress passed the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),
which updated the name of the Kenai Moose
Range to the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge;
expanded the Refuge’s territory; and designated
1.35 million acres of the Refuge, including
Tustumena Lake, as national wilderness under the
1964 Wilderness Act. 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. U.S., 59
Fed. Cl. 246 (2003).
Stephanie Showalter,  J.D., M.S.E.L.
In 2001, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims deter-
mined that certain California water users were
ent i t led  to  compensat ion  under  the  Fi f th
Amendment for the loss of contractually conferred
water due to governmental restrictions imposed to
protect the delta smelt and winter-run chinook
salmon.1 In December 2003, following a separate
trial on damages, the court concluded that the
water users were owed damages in the amount of
$13,915,364.78 plus interest.
Background
This litigation revolves around two water projects
in California: the Central Valley Project (CVP),
Water Users Awarded
Over 
$14 Million 
See Tulare Lake, page 18
See Alaska, page 14
Stocking Project Deemed
“Commercial Enterprise”
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The Law Center is two years old! I can hardly
believe it. As with any program establishing an
identity, there have been many changes over the
years. Thank you, our loyal subscribers, for sup-
porting us through these transitions. Your support
will not go unrewarded. Our third year is shaping
up to be the best one yet!
Welcome to the new, expanded version of THE
SANDBAR! We have expanded to twenty-four pages,
as sixteen was just not enough space to cover all of
the developing legal issues across the nation. Now
that the Editorial Staff has ample space, each issue
of THE SANDBAR will feature a case summary or
article from each region of the United States - New
England, the Mid-Atlantic, the Southeast, the
Great Lakes, Alaska, California, and Hawaii. Gulf
of Mexico issues will continue to be covered in
WATER LOG, the legal reporter for the Mississippi-
Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program.
As always, we urge you to contact us with your
thoughts and suggestions. Are there certain cases
or issues we should be covering? Is there a job
opening or new publication you would like us to
announce? Please let us know how we can serve you
better. We would love to hear from you. Enjoy!
Stephanie Showalter
Editor
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Fund For Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209
(D.D.C. 2003).
Shannon McGhee, 2L1 
The U.S.  District  Court for the District  of
Columbia determined there was substantial evi-
dence to support a claim that the issuance of a
depredation permit by the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) to the State of Maryland for the
killing of 525 mute swans failed to meet require-
ments of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and thereby justified a preliminary injunction. 
Background
The “Atlantic Flyways,” which is comprised of sev-
enteen states along the Eastern Seaboard of the
United States, is home to approximately 14,000
non-native mute swans. Under MBTA regulations,
a depredation permit must be sought from FWS in
order to legally “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect” mute swans.2 Before any
depredation permit is issued, FWS, under NEPA
regulations, must assess all of the significant
impacts a proposed action might have on the
human environment. 
However, through a “categorical exclusion”3
under NEPA, FWS issued Maryland a depredation
permit without performing any type of environ-
mental assessment. The state of Maryland was
granted a permit authorizing the killing of up to
1,500 mute swans as part of “a comprehensive mute
swan management plan” that would be implement-
ed in 2003. The Fund for Animals, a wildlife pro-
tection organization, filed suit challenging
Maryland’s permit. However, Maryland promised
to voluntarily surrender its permit pending the
preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA)
by FWS and the suit was dropped. On July 2, 2003,
the FWS registered a  Draft  Environmental
Assessment on the Management of Mute Swans in the
Atlantic Flyway (Draft EA) for review, setting July
16, 2003 as the deadline for public comments.
After reviewing public comments, FWS issued
a Final EA on August 7, 2003 concluding that mute
swans were causing critical environmental damage
t o  t h e  u n d e r w a t e r  p l a n t  c o m m u n i t i e s  o f
Chesapeake Bay by consuming up to eight pounds
per day of Submerged Aquatic Vegetation (SAV).4
The Final EA further explained the “taking” of
mute swans as a method of minimizing such envi-
ronmental damage would have no “significant
impact on the human environment” and, therefore,
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was
unnecessary. Maryland then renewed its depreda-
tion permit for the “taking” of 525 mute swans.
Shortly thereafter, the Fund for Animals com-
menced an action asking the Court to enjoin the
state of Maryland’s renewed depredation permit.
Standard of Review
On a motion for preliminary injunction, plain-
tiffs must demonstrate “(1) a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that
there will be no substantial injury to other inter-
ested parties, and (4) that the public interest
would be served by the injunction.”5 No one fac-
tor, however is determinative.
Irreparable Harm
The Fund for Animals argued if all of the depreda-
tion permits from the Final EA were considered in
the aggregate, irreparable harm to their aesthetic
interests to view, interact with, study and appreci-
ate mute swans would ensue because 86 percent of
the mute swans in Maryland and 67 percent of the
current mute swans in the Atlantic Flyway would
be at risk of being killed.6 Plaintiffs also contended
irreparable harm from the violation of their proce-
dura l  r ight s  under  NEPA.  The  Mary land
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) refut-
ed these claims, by arguing that: (1) Maryland or
any state’s maximum “take” limits are adjusted
upward or downward on an individual and annual
basis, (2) plaintiffs failed to allege irreparable
harm from the issuance of permits to other states in
the Atlantic Flyway, and (3) plaintiffs presented no
evidence of harm from the past killing of 1,700
mute swans in Maryland. In addition, MDNR con-
Court Enjoins Mute Swan Cull
See Mute Swan, page 4
tended the “taking” of 525 swans, a mere 14.5 per-
cent reduction of the current mute swan popula-
tion in Maryland from remote areas where plain-
tiffs neither travel nor live, would result in mini-
mal or no irreparable harm.
The court found MDNR’s arguments unper-
suasive, stating that the plaintiffs’ claim for
irreparable harm was pursuant to the particular
swans located in Maryland and not all swans in
the Atlantic Flyway. Furthermore, the plaintiffs
were claiming they would suffer not from the past
killing of mute swans, but from the additional
taking of 525 mute swans. The court concluded
that, although a NEPA violation standing alone
was insufficient to support a preliminary injunc-
tion, when that violation was combined with the
plaintiffs’ other claim of aesthetic irreparable
harm, plaintiffs adequately established the exis-
tence of irreparable harm absent a preliminary
injunction.
Substantial Harm to Other Parties
MDNR further argued even if the plaintiffs demon-
strated irreparable harm, the Chesapeake Bay and
native wildlife would suffer greater harm by the
daily degradation caused from the present mute
swan population and its progeny. The court dis-
agreed, noting the current 9.2 percent mute swan
growth rate was easily manageable even if the
agency’s course of action was delayed a year.
MDNR officials explained that the supposed 10
percent consumption of SAV biomass by mute
swans has a negligible bay-wide effect; thus the
court held that an injunction delaying the “tak-
ing” of swans a few months to ensure the vindica-
tion of the public’s interest would surely not result
in irreparable harm to the Chesapeake Bay.
Finally, the court found MDNR’s immediate need
for the taking of 525 mute swans to be a mere
assertion that it would be “easier” to take swans
now than later.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
NEPA
The Fund for Animals argued that the FWS find-
ing of no significant impact (FONSI) and its deci-
sion not to proceed with an EIS to further evaluate
the environmental impacts of depredation permits
were  arbi t rary  and capr ic ious .  Under  the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), FWS actions
may only be overturned if they were arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Under this
standard of review courts examine “(1) whether
the agency took a ‘hard look’ at the problem; (2)
whether the agency identified the relevant areas of
environmental concern; (3) as to the problems
studied and identified, whether the agency made a
convincing case that the impact was insignificant;
and (4) if there was an impact of true significance,
whether the agency convincingly established that
changes in the project sufficiently reduced it to a
minimum.”7 MDNR contended that “by describ-
ing the proposed action, examining reasonable
alternatives, considering environmental impacts,
and providing a list of individuals and agencies
consulted” in the Final EA all of NEPA’s require-
ments were met.
The court held the plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits for their claim
that FWS failed to involve the public “to the great-
est extent possible” in taking a “hard look” at alter-
natives for managing Maryland’s mute swan popu-
lation. The court reasoned that the public was
given a total of only nine working days in the mid-
dle of the summer to review and submit comments
on a Draft EA that lacked specific information,
e.g., which local environments would be affected
by the proposed action. The court noted that
describing the location of the action as “covering
6000 square miles and 15 of 24 counties within the
state,” did not translate into any greater specificity
as to the effects on local mute swan populations.8
In addition, the court pointed out, the FWS asser-
tion that it received and reviewed “thousands of
comments” from 13 state wildlife agencies, 53
organizations, and 2,620 individuals in such a
short period of time between July 16 and the July
31, 2003 deadline, as weighing more heavily for
plaintiffs, i.e., FWS did not take the appropriate
“hard look.”9
The court also found FWS’s post-hoc rational-
ization of issuing depredation permits prior to a
Final EA unconvincing, stating that MDNR’s
assertion that FWS actions are “entitled to a pre-
sumption of regularity” does not protect the agency
from its obligation to perform a “thorough, prob-
ing, in-depth review” of the agency’s proposed
course of action.
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The Fund for Animals also successfully
argued that although the “taking” of mute swans
may have a minimal environmental impact on the
entire state, FWS failed to evaluate the significant
impacts, whether adverse or beneficial, at the
local level. Additionally, the court reasoned that
the “uncertainty as to the impact of a proposed
action on a local population of a species, even
where all parties acknowledge that the action will
have little or no effect on broader populations, is
‘a basis for a finding that there will be a
significant impact’ and setting aside a
FONSI [finding of no significant
impact].”10 Therefore, plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on the
merits that the FWS decision to issue a
FONSI was arbitrary and capricious.
The court found FWS had estab-
lished a sufficient nexus between iden-
tifying the degradation of SAV by mute
swans and its proposed action to correct
it by reducing the mute swan popula-
tion. Moreover, the court was not con-
vinced that the FWS issuance of per-
mits had created a precedent since the
permits contemplated by the Final EA
are reevaluated on an annual and indi-
vidual basis. Similarly, the court ruled
the plaintiffs failed to identify any sci-
entific controversy of the effects of
k i l l i n g  m u t e  s w a n s  t h r o u g h o u t
Maryland or the “Atlantic Flyway”
region. Nevertheless, the court found
the plaintiffs raised “substantial questions” as to
the existence of at least two significant factors,
and therefore demonstrated a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.
MBTA
MBTA regulations stipulate that migratory birds
may only be killed pursuant to a depredation per-
mit which states “the ‘location where the request-
ed permitted activity is to be conducted,’ as well as
a ‘description of the area where depredations are
occurring,’ the ‘nature of the crops or other inter-
ests being injured,’  and the ‘extent of such
injury.’”11 The Fund for Animals alleged that the
FWS’s failure to ensure MDNR met MBTA
requirements or to explain how such require-
ments were satisfied prior to the issuance of
Maryland’s depredation permit amounted to arbi-
trary and capricious agency action.
The court held that although MDNR specified
which public lands would be rendered “swan free”
as well as provided a generalized description of
the types of areas where “removal” activities
would take place, MDNR failed to specify the
localized and specific types of damage mute swans
cause in those areas, nor did MDNR indicate the
number of swans planned to be removed from
each area. Furthermore, MDNR only chose the
depredation permit to cover areas where mute
swans are most likely to be found, not where the
greatest extent of SAV damage is occurring.
Finally, even though defendants assert an equally
strong public interest in preservation and restora-
tion of the Chesapeake Bay, they ultimately fell
short of meeting the burden of establishing why
their long-term goal could not be accomplished in
the future. As a result, the court was persuaded
that plaintiffs had a “substantial case on the mer-
its,” that defendants failed to comply with MBTA
standards, and therefore plaintiffs were entitled to
injunctive relief.
Mute Swan, courtesy of NOAA’s Coastline Collection
Photographer - Mary Hollinger, NODC biologist
See Mute Swan,  page 15
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Tripp Bridges, 3L
Tripp Bridges is a third-year law student at the
University of Georgia School of Law in Athens,
Georgia. The views expressed below are the author’s
own. This article does not necessarily reflect the
opinions and positions of the National Sea Grant
Law Center and its affiliates. 
Georgia is fortunate to have many rivers that
can be used for recreational boating. Canoeing
and kayaking are recreational activities enjoyed
by many people in the state. These numbers will
undoubtedly increase with the population
growth of Atlanta and its suburbs. Generally
canoeists have enjoyed relatively free access to
many of Georgia’s larger rivers, however in
recent years there have been some notable
exceptions. 
The following two cases exemplify the prob-
lems that the public has had in gaining access to
some of Georgia’s non-navigable rivers. In
Georgia Canoeing Assoc. v. Henry, 482 S.E.2d 298,
267 Ga. App. 814 (1997), the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s opinion that the public
did not have a right of passage down Armuchee
Creek where it flowed through Mr. Henry’s land.
The Georgia Canoeing Association was seeking
to enjoin Mr. Henry from stopping free passage
by the public down the river. In Givens v.
Ichauway, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 148, 268 Ga. 710
(1997), the court found that the Ichauway-
nochaway Creek was non-navigable, and there-
fore inaccessible to boaters, even though the
appellant was able to navigate a small raft carry-
ing two people, a goat, and a bale of cotton in
attempts to prove navigability under the stan-
dard of commerce of the nineteenth century.
As illustrated by the aforementioned cases,
current Georgia law does not allow a right of
passage for the public down non-navigable
rivers. According to O.C.G.A. § 44-8-2 the adja-
cent landowner owns the bed of a non-navigable
river to the midpoint, and if the landowner owns
both sides of the river, then ownership extends
to the entire streambed. The same is true if the
river is a boundary between properties; the
landowners both own to the midpoint, and
could join together and prohibit passage down
the river.1 The legislature passed this law long
before the start of any significant recreational
boating in the region. This section of the code
effectively prohibits the public from using many
of Georgia’s scenic rivers. Consideration should
be given to changing it to allow a right of
through passage down non-navigable rivers. 
At this time Georgia boaters only have a
right  of  passage down navigable  waters .
Georgia’s definition of navigable is surprisingly
restrictive. Under Georgia law, navigable
streams are those “capable of transporting boats
loaded with freight in the regular course of
trade either for the whole or a part of the year.
The mere rafting of timber or the transporting
of wood in small boats shall not make a stream
navigable.”2 Few rivers in Georgia qualify under
Georgia law as navigable due to the fact many
barges are over 200 feet long, and few rivers
would be able to support such boats.3 This
restrictive definition precludes a right of pas-
sage on most of Georgia’s rivers, including the
Chattooga, Chestatee, and Toccoa, which are
frequently used for canoeing. 
Remedies
Several legislative options are available to reme-
dy this situation. The first option is to establish
by statute the right of free passage down non-nav-
igable rivers. The second option is to broaden
Georgia’s definition of “navigable.” Thirdly, the
state could condemn specific riverbeds for recre-
ational use. 
Public Access to Non-Navigable
Rivers - Ideas for Change in
Georgia: A Comment
The first option, establishing a
right of free passage down non-
navigable rivers, may be the sim-
plest answer to this problem. This
option avoids the uncertainty of
judicial interpretation of naviga-
bility, which would be required if
Georgia’s definition of navigabili-
ty was changed. When establish-
ing a right of passage for the pub-
lic on non-navigable rivers, the
landowner would still retain own-
ership of the streambed. Boaters
would simply obtain a statutory
right to pass over it. This option
would also avoid the costs of liti-
gation and compensation involved
with condemning the riverbeds. 
One possible objection to this option is that
establishing free right of passage may be consid-
ered an unconstitutional taking of property
under the Fifth Amendment. A free passage
mandate could be considered a taking because it
precludes a landowner from excluding others
from his property. It can be argued, however,
that the landowner merely owns the streambed,
and allowing the public  to pass over the
streambed in boats does not affect his ability to
exclude the public from the streambed itself.
Anchoring on the riverbed or walking on the
bank would still be forms of trespassing. The
passage of boaters on streams where the water
flow is insufficient to allow passage without
portage, could be avoided by allowing a right of
passage to the public only on streams that had
an average annual flow above a certain specified
cubic feet per second. 
The second option, changing Georgia’s defi-
nition of navigable rivers to be more inclusive,
is also a viable alternative. The statutory defini-
tion could be amended to include streams capa-
ble of being used for canoeing. Another possibil-
ity is adoption of the federal standard of naviga-
bility, as set forth in United States v. Harrell, 926
F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir. 1991), which depends
on whether a river is used, or susceptible of
being used, in its ordinary condition to trans-
port commerce. Under this definition, the abili-
ty to commercially float logs is evidence of navi-
gability. This standard is much more lenient
than Georgia’s standard, which requires the
ability to handle commercial barges. The feder-
al standard would allow for more access to
appropriate rivers, and avoid use on rivers that
are clearly unfit for public use.
However, if Georgia changed its require-
ments for navigability to the federal standard,
there would still be a large number of streams
that are currently used for kayaking and canoe-
ing, which would not qualify because they can-
not support commercial log floating. Thus,
Georgia should consider going beyond the fed-
eral standard to allow free access to rivers cur-
rently being used for boating. 
The third option, condemning specific
riverbeds for public recreational use, would be
costly, but would avoid takings challenges.
Besides the cost of the actual compensation,
there could be large litigation costs as well
because of disputes over the amount of compen-
sation. One advantage to this course of action
would be that if the state condemned the
riverbed, then not only would a right of passage
be allowed for boaters, but this would also open
fishing rights on the river to the public. 
Fishing in many of Georgia’s rivers and
streams requires wading down the stream. This
would not be allowed under a law merely pro-
viding a right of passage to the public because a
person wading actually touches the streambed,
which still belongs to the adjacent landowner.
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Canoeing in Georgia
Courtesy of USFWS, Photograph by Joe Doherty
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Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
After publication in our last issue of some cursory
research on H.B. 218, a controversial bill pending
before the Ohio State Legislature that attempts to
shift the boundary between private and public land
along Lake Erie, additional information came to
light which altered portions of the original analysis.
This update serves to clarify the Law Center’s orig-
inal position. It is not, nor is it intended to be, a
work of advocacy. The information presented below
should not be relied on in litigation or cited as
established fact. In such a contentious and unset-
tled area of law there are often many potential inter-
pretations of the same doctrines.
The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine.
The common law “consists of those principles,
usage, and rules of action applicable to government
and security of persons and property which do not
rest for their authority upon any express and posi-
tive declaration of the will of the legislature.”1 In its
simplest terms, common law is judge-made law. 
Under the common law, the public trust doc-
trine provides that “public trust lands, waters and
living resources in a State are held by the State in
trust for the benefit of all the people, and establish-
es the right of the public to fully enjoy public trust
lands, waters and living resources for a wide variety
of public uses.”2 Public trust waters are the state’s
navigable waters and public trust lands are the
lands beneath those navigable waters, up to the
ordinary high water mark.3 Public trust lands
include tidelands, shorelands, and the land beneath
oceans, lakes, and rivers. 
To some extent, states can supercede the com-
mon law with legislation. Although the public trust
lands extend to the high water mark under the com-
mon law, a state is free to establish different bound-
aries through legislation. For example, Delaware,
Maine ,  Massachuse t t s ,  New Hampshi re ,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin have all
granted private property owners rights seaward of
the high-water mark. These states are low-water
states, meaning the boundary between public and
private land is the low-water mark. However, even
in these states a coastal property owner’s rights in
the intertidal zone are subservient to the public’s
right of access for fishing, fowling, and navigation,
which is in turn subservient to the private owner’s
right to wharf out, by means of docks, etc.
The Boundary of Lake Erie
The Ohio Legislature has established the boundary
of Lake Erie through legislation. Section 1506.10 of
the Ohio Code states that
the waters of Lake Erie extending from the
southerly shore of Lake Erie to the internation-
al boundary line between the United States and
Canada, together with the soil beneath and
their contents, do now belong and have always,
since the organization of the state of Ohio,
belonged to the state as proprietor in trust for
the people of the state.4
The demarcation line between public and pri-
vate land and, therefore, the upper boundary of the
public trust lands in Ohio is the “southerly shore”
of Lake Erie. While the term “southerly shore” has
not been explicitly defined by the Legislature or the
courts, it is clear that “a littoral owner along Lake
Erie has no title beyond the natural shoreline.”5 In
1948, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “the lit-
toral owners of the upland [along Lake Erie] have
no title beyond the natural shore line; they have
only the right of access and wharfing out to naviga-
ble waters.”6 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
failed to define “natural shoreline” and determin-
ing where the natural shoreline falls on a particular
parcel of land remains a question of fact for a jury
or other factfinder.
Because the term is not defined in the act, the
responsibility falls to the state agencies to define
“southerly shore” through regulations, policies, and
actions. ODNR’s activities in this area have not
been consistent, although the agency does currently
use the high water mark to establish the boundary
between public and private land. Over the years
shorefront owners have challenged ODNR’s actions
in court, but the Ohio courts have failed to either
expressly or clearly define the term “southerly
shore.” In cases not involving boundary disputes,
both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio
Ohio H.B. 218 - An Update
Supreme Court have ruled that the territory of a
shorefront city extends to the low water mark.7 The
Court of Appeals recently had the chance to rule on
the ODNR’s use of the Ordinary High Water mark.
Shorefront property owners challenged the issuance
of a submerged land lease for Lake Erie. Beach
Cliff, an adjacent property owner, contended that
“there is no support for ODNR’s arbitrary assign-
ment of 573.4’ or the ordinary high water (“OHW”)
mark as the elevation from which a determination
is made whether land is submerged.”8 The Ohio
Court of Common Pleas had avoided ruling on
whether the OHW was the appropriate boundary by
finding the elevation level not to be the determina-
tive factor. The trial court “found that the defini-
tion of submerged land is based upon the location
of the natural shoreline.”9
The Court of Appeals sidestepped the issue.
“Even if we were to assume that the OHW elevation
of 573.4’ is the demarcation point for submerged
lands, the record before us supports that the parties’
evidence is in dispute as to whether the property at
issue is below this elevation mark.” The Court did
recognize that “ODNR uses the OHW in determin-
ing whether land is submerged and whether a sub-
merged land lease must be issued,” but made no
ruling on whether the actions of the ODNR were
appropriate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, but on different
grounds, stating “that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the issue of the presence of
historic fill on the site of the beachfront property.
This finding [by ODNR of the presence of historic
fill] satisfies the definition of ‘territory’ contained
in R.C. 1506.11 and likewise satisfies the require-
ments for the issuance of a submerged land lease on
land subject to the state’s public trust.”10
The issuance of the submerged land lease was
upheld by the trial court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, without a determination regarding the
appropriateness of the OHW. ODNR’s reliance on
the OHW appears to have been upheld on a techni-
cality – the ability of the courts to find another,
acceptable ground for issuance of the leases.
Conclusion
For over a century, Ohio courts have recognized
that certain waters and lands are held by the state
in trust for the public. The public has a right to
access these “public trust” areas to fish, for naviga-
tion, and sometimes for recreational purposes.
Private littoral and riparian owners, however, have
rights as well. Every state struggles to find a way to
balance the public right of access with the rights of
private owners. Currently under Ohio law, the
boundary between public and private land on Lake
Erie is the “southerly shore,” which is usually
defined as the “natural shoreline.” H.B. 218
attempts to shift that line, among other things. Due
to the potentially significant implications of H.B.
218, which is currently stalled in the Senate, the
Law Center will continue to track this legislation as
it moves through the Ohio Legislature.
Endnotes
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LEXIS 3129 (Ohio App. 1974); Mitchell v.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 30 Ohio St.
3d 92, 94 (Ohio 1987).
8.   Beach Cliff Board of Trustees v. Ferchill, 2003
Ohio 2300, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2132 at *10
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Beach at East Harbor State Park, Port Clinton, Ohio
Courtesy of U.S. EPA, Great Lakes National Program
Photo by Arnold W. Ehrsam
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New Lobster Regulations Do
Not Violate Atlantic Coastal Act
Little Bay Lobster Co. v. Evans, 352 F.3d 462 (1st
Cir. 2003).
T.B. Boardman, Jr., 3L1
Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied
an appeal by the New Hampshire-based Little Bay
Lobster Company (Little Bay) claiming: first, that
the expansion of a stringently regulated fishing
area was in conflict with certain national standards
set forth in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (MSA) and;
second, that the agency’s rule-making process
denied Little Bay certain procedural safeguards
afforded to it by the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA). The First Circuit denied both contentions
reasoning that Little Bay had improperly argued
its claims and that the rule-making agency met its
requirements of reasonability.
Background
This case concerns Northeast lobster fishing and
the enlargement of a stringently regulated area in
the Gulf of Maine. In 1983, pursuant to its autho-
rization under the MSA, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) implemented a fishery
management plan (FMP), recommended by the
New England Fishery Management Council
(Council), to remedy the population decline of the
Northeast lobster. 
A decade after its implementation, a study
revealed that the population was still in danger. As
a result, a new FMP was developed delineating the
Gulf of Maine into four distinct areas, each subject
to different restrictions. Specifically pertinent to
Little Bay was the boundary between the strin-
gently regulated Area 1 and the less stringently
regulated Area 3. Area 1 begins three miles off-
shore and extends seaward to the beginning of
Area 3 thirty miles from the coast. 
During the implementation of the 1983 FMP,
Congress had adopted the Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries Cooperative Management Act (Atlantic
Coastal Act). Congress charged the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission
(Commission) with the development, implemen-
tation and enforcement of coastal fishery plans.
Although primarily concerned with regulating
fisheries within state waters, when regulations do
not exist for federal waters under the MSA, the
Secretary of Commerce can adopt plans, under
the Atlantic Coastal Act, for those federal waters
so long as several requirements are met.
For example, the Secretary must con-
sult with the regional Councils and the
plans must be consistent with the
National Standards of the MSA. 
In  1999 ,  the  NMFS proposed
Amendment 3, which would withdraw
the existing MSA regulations and adopt
new regulations under the authority of
the Atlantic Coastal Act. Specifically,
not only would the new plan bestow
more stringent regulations in both Areas
1 and 3 but would move the thirty mile
boundary between the areas an addition-
al twenty miles offshore. The conse-
quences were significant for lobster fish-
ermen, especially those accustomed to
Hauling in lobster trap
Courtesy of NOAA Fisheries Collection
fishing in the area lying between the old boundary
and the new. Following a public comment period,
the Secretary adopted Amendment 3.
A number of Portsmouth, New Hampshire lob-
ster boat operators, including Little Bay, brought
sui t  in  federa l  d i s t r i c t  cour t  cha l lenging
Amendment 3. The district court granted summa-
ry judgment in favor of the Secretary, and this
appeal ensued.
Failure to Consult
Little Bay claims that the Secretary’s failure to
adequately consult the Council, a requirement of
the Atlantic Coastal Act, unduly prejudiced Little
Bay by not affording it an opportunity to appear
before the Council and argue against the amend-
ment. However, the First Circuit determined that
“this is a standard harmless error argument” and
looked to whether the decision would have been
altered with more formal consultation. The court
undertook this inquiry and held that “there is no
reason to think that consultation would have pro-
duced a different result.”2 Therefore, Little Bay
was not unduly prejudiced by the agency’s failure
to formally consult.
National Standards
Little Bay then focused on a second condition
mandated by the Atlantic Coastal Act; essentially,
that the regulations must conform to the National
Standards set forth in the MSA. Specifically, Little
Bay contends that the new regulations are in con-
flict with National Standards 2, 4, and 8.
Standard 2: National Standard 2 provides that
a FMP must be “based upon the best scientific
information available.”3 Little Bay claims that the
Secretary failed to present any scientific analysis
or reasoning to support the shift in boundary line.
Specifically, Little Bay refers to the unique
restrictions of Area 3 which require a showing of
historic participation to fish in that area. In this
regard, it contends, a net increase in lobster catch-
es will result since Area 3, prior to the amend-
ment, was restricted only to those that could prove
historic participation. With the change in bound-
ary line, Area 3 can now be accessed by all. The
court conceived the logic of the argument yet
deemed it fatal since Little Bay failed to further
develop the contention.
Standard 4: National Standard 4 provides that
any action that “allocates or assigns fishing privi-
leges . . . [be] . . . fair and equitable to all such fish-
ermen.”4 Little Bay contends that the boundary
shift was a form of allocation but the court quickly
disposed of this argument by noting that the line
shift does not in any way prevent fishermen from
operating in any areas. That argument, the court
remarked, would be once again focusing on the
“historic participation” limitations which were not
at issue in the case.
Standard 8: When adopting restrictions
National Standard 8 requires the Secretary, “to
the extent practicable,” to minimize the negative
effects on local fishing communities.5 Little Bay
argued that the EIS had not assessed the bound-
ary line shift’s influence on local communities.
The court agreed, but nonetheless found that the
EIS analysis was not “clearly unreasonable” and
therefore, satisfied the requirements of Standard
8. Its decision was based on a “rule of reason” that
does not require every element of a plan to be
addressed. Therefore, since the impacts of the
boundary line shift were the subject of a full scale
study and Little Bay failed to show why the
impact was unreasonable, the Secretary did not
act unreasonably.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Little Bay’s final challenge was based on the RFA.
This procedural safeguard, similar to that of
National Standard 8, is intended to ensure that
during the agency’s rule-making process attention
is given to the concerns of small entities affected.
Little Bay contended that separate attention was
not given to comments regarding the change in the
boundary line and therefore, it was deprived of its
privileges afforded by the RFA. The court recog-
nized that the agency’s final statement did little
more than acknowledge that several commentators
had objected to the boundary line and admitted
that the agency did not separately analyze the
impacts of new regimes with and without the
boundary shift. Nonetheless, the court found that
the agency’s obligation is simply to make a reason-
able good faith effort to address comments and
alternatives and there is no obligation to treat
every element of a plan as a separate alternative.
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Gary Wood, J.D., NORTHWEST STRAITS COMMISSION
Marine Killing Fields
Abandoned, lost, and discarded fishing equipment
lays submerged wherever the world’s oceans have
been fished, and the salmon-rich inland sea of
Puget Sound is no exception. The designation
derelict fishing gear consists of nets, traps, hooks,
weights, lines, or crab and shrimp pots abandoned
or lost during commercial and sport fishing. Since
modern fishing equipment is composed of synthet-
ic monofilament, lost nets survive for decades.1 All
the while they present safety, liability, and nui-
sance issues, but the real harm is their persistent,
deadly impact on species and habitats. 
“Ghost nets” — so called by divers because
monofilament is invisible underwater2 — entangles
divers and swimmers, often with fatal results; while
huge trawl nets damage propellers and rudders,
putting even the largest oceangoing vessels and
crews in peril. 
At a minimum, such gear continues to do what
it was designed to do: entangle and kill fish. At
loose in the benthic environment each net becomes
a veritable “killing field” trapping fish and fin —
even shellfish, crabs, birds and marine mammals,
including endangered or threatened species —
depending on the site. Each entanglement becomes
bait for the next, in turns, so the nets passively
‘fish up the food chain.’ The consequence of this
historic accumulation is an “unobserved mortali-
ty” that continues unabated in most harbors and
oceans today. The economic impact of these losses
is inestimable.
If such a wasteful carnage were to occur terres-
trially, imagine the outcry for a solution. 
Obstacles to Recovery
The problem cries out for remediation, but the
work has just started. Efforts by NOAA in 2002 and
2003 to clean up nets in the Northwest Hawaiian
chain yielded a grisly harvest of commercial gear
and dead or dying sealife by the tons, but these
were very expensive operations involving research
ships and dive crews at sea for several weeks.
Funding ongoing cleanups there as elsewhere
remains an unresolved issue, and the source of
‘imported’ gear must be addressed.
Puget Sound presents different challenges: the
Northwest Straits are within a temperate, deep
inland sea with 100 years of commercial and sport-
fishing gear (and centuries of tribal nets) hanging
on its steep walls and draped on rocky reefs along
salmon migratory corridors. In 1999, several wild
species of salmon were listed under the Endangered
Species Act, the first such action within a metro-
politan population and commerce center.3
Yet there had never been a concerted effort to deal
with the gear problem, other than one report to the
legislature deploring the nets problem, but confound-
ed to solve it because of ‘liability issues.’ In fact,
Washington’s own state law was the major impedi-
ment to gear removal operations, unintentionally.
At the time, a regulatory, punitive approach
that penalized commercial fishing operators who
reported gear losses constituted the sole redress of
the problem. Considering that the value of com-
plex seine and trawl equipment is $15,000 –
$40,000, its loss is an immediate and severe eco-
nomic blow – often cut loose to save a hapless fish-
ing boat from its grasp. 
The added imposition of a fine or license suspen-
sion for such reported losses, employing classic leg-
islative wisdom, was the lawful “deterrent.” Indeed,
reporting lost gear did cease, wholly deterred.
Nonetheless, gear losses – and those unobserved
mortalities – persisted out-of-sight, and out-of-mind.
Another principal impediment to recovering this
material was the safety issue. The stuff is dangerous.
No protocol for removal operations existed; and safe-
ty was a paramount concern of the pilot project.
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“No-fault” Derelict Gear Recovery: An
End to the Blame Game Leads to
Successful Gear-removal in Puget Sound
Commission Awarded NOAA Grant
T h e  N o r t h w e s t  S t r a i t s  C o m m i s s i o n ,
http://www.nwstraits.org , is a regional citizens’
panel authorized by the Northwest Straits Marine
Conservation Initiative,4 a bipartisan measure autho-
rized by Congress in 1998. This innovative
Initiative employs a county-based “bottom-up”
approach to the protection of the region’s vital
marine resources; addressing them community by
community, by diverse stakeholders sitting on a
Marine Resources Committee (MRC). Over 100
active volunteers, representing local planners, trib-
al co-managers, and the scientific, economic, com-
mercial fisheries, recreational, aquaculture and
conservation communities have accepted appoint-
ments to seven county MRCs in the Straits.
Where appropriate, the Commission under-
takes regional projects that protect or restore the
area’s marine resources. The derelict gear prob-
lem presented an opportunity to design and initi-
ate a pilot remediation program. Dr. Andrea
Copping of Washington Sea Grant co-authored
(with this writer) a successful funding proposal,5
and Sea Grant was instrumental in building the
project’s team. The ensuing ‘Northern Puget
Sound Derelict Gear Recovery Project’ developed,
tested and duly secured approval for new recovery
protocols6 for removing fishing gear from those
cold, deep waters – safely and with regard for the
surrounding habitats. 
But first, they had to fix the law.
New Statute Adopted
In 2002, the Commission sponsored and shepherd-
ed Washington Senate Bill SB6313 through the
state legislature, establishing a new legal frame-
work that enabled actual gear recovery operations –
and divers — to get into the water. The proposed
revision to state law had three stated purposes: 
The legislature finds that fishing gear that is
lost or abandoned may continue to catch
marine organisms long after the gear is lost. The
purpose of this act is to develop safe, effective meth-
ods to remove derelict fishing gear, eliminate regula-
tory barriers to gear removal, and discourage future
losses of fishing gear.7
The project’s sponsors attacked the problem
strategically, and removed the regulatory barriers,
while ensuring that future recovery efforts would
be safe, monitored and conducted in accord with
the new protocols.
Reporting Gear Losses: The Commission was not
interested in assessing blame. “The objective was
removal of submerged gear and restoration of the
affected marine habitats,” explains Tom Cowan,
the Commission’s director, who used his savvy as
an ex-legislative aide to guide the legislation. To
that end, a remarkable new code section added
“encouragement” to the loss-reporting issue, in
lieu of penalties: a person who loses or abandons
commercial fishing gear within the waters of the
state is encouraged to report the location of the loss
and the type of gear lost to the department within
forty-eight hours of the loss.8
The ‘encouragement’ was not lip service: the
Commission’s program introduced no-fault to net
recovery, and followed through by providing for a
toll-free “1-800-Gear Hotline”9 and an on-line
reporting website for divers, fishermen, boaters,
beach-goers and anyone involved with the marine
environment to report sightings with ease - in the
water or on shore.10 (Recreational scuba divers are
strongly cautioned in all program materials to
avoid the gear because of the inherent dangers.) 
Gear Location Database: A GIS database of
reported gear has been built to map recovery sites,
and help set priorities for removal efforts, based on
threats to public safety and marine resources, haz-
ards to navigation and other criteria. The gear loca-
tions are not made public.
Removal Guidelines: Another feature of the new
statute required the state’s Fish & Wildlife agency
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Dive Team recovers a derelict net from Puget Sound
Photograph by Gary Wood
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In 1974, the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game (Department) had initiated a research pro-
ject at Tustumena Lake, which involved the release
of sockeye salmon fry into the Lake. The project
operated without permits issued by the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) as the project started
before the designation of Tustumena Lake as a
national wilderness. When ANILCA was passed,
the  Kena i  Re fuge  Manager  in formed  the
Department that a permit would be required to
continue. Because the purpose of the project was
to study the effects of stocking on native fish and
on the incidence of disease, the FWS issued the
Department special permits on a yearly basis. In
1992, the Department requested that the stocking
project be upgraded to an enhancement project for
the primary benefit of the Cook Inlet fishing
industry. The enhancement project was contracted
out to the Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association
(CIAA) due to a curtailing state budget. The CIAA
continue to use the project to provide commercial
fishermen with a steady supply of salmon. 
Once CIAA was in control, the Wilderness
Society questioned the purpose of the enhance-
ment project especially since it utilized lake
resources of the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge.
The Wilderness Society filed suit claiming that the
FWS’s permit to CIAA violated the Wilderness
Act on the grounds that the permit offended the
Wilderness Act’s mandate to preserve “natural
conditions” that are part of the wilderness charac-
ter of the area and that the enhancement project
was an impermissible “commercial enterprise”
within a designated wilderness area. The district
court entered summary judgment for the FWS,
“finding that the Enhancement Project [was] not a
‘commercial enterprise’ that Congress prohibited
within the designated wilderness.”2
Are Commercial Enterprises Prohibited?
In reviewing an agency action, the court must con-
duct a two-step analysis. First and foremost, if con-
gressional intent has been
manifested through the plain
meaning of an act or statute,
that intent should be enforced
without question. If Congress’
intent is clear, the agency must
give effect to the stated intent
of Congress. If Congressional
intent is not clear, then the
court must consider whether
the agency’s action is based
upon a permissible interpreta-
tion of the statute.
The Court began its analy-
sis with the Wilderness Act.
Section 4(c) states that, “there
shall be no commercial enter-
prise . . .  within any wilderness
area.”3 Because commercial
enterprise is not defined in the
Act, the court examined other
sections of the Act to determine Congressional
intent. Wilderness is partially defined as “an area
where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man.”4 Also, the Wilderness Act’s
declaration of policy includes the goal of “protec-
tion of these areas” and “preservation of their
wilderness character.”5 The Ninth Circuit found
this language unambiguous enough to find clear
congressional intent to preclude commercial
enterprises in designated wilderness areas, regard-
less of the form of commercial activity. Thus, the
FWS’s decision regarding the enhancement pro-
ject was not entitled to deference as it failed to give
effect to the plain meaning of the statute.
Alaska, from page 1
Kenai Refuge Lakes
Courtesy of USFWS, Photograph by Spencer
Is the Enhancement Project a Commercial Enterprise?
The Ninth Circuit next examined whether the
enhancement project was truly a commercial
ac t iv i ty  that  should  be  banned  under  the
Wilderness Act. To determine whether an activity
is a “commercial enterprise,” courts examine both
its purpose and effect.6 The CIAA and the FWS
claimed the enhancement project was not a com-
mercial enterprise because it was run by a non-
profit organization and had previously been run
and regulated by the State of Alaska itself. The
court points out, however, that the non-profit
CIAA is funded by for-profit organizations that
directly benefit from the CIAA’s fish stocking
activities. Furthermore, prior state control of the
project is irrelevant because state control was
based on research activities, not the maintenance
of fish supplies for commercial fishermen. 
The court cited several documents in support
of this conclusion, such as a report by the Kenai
Refuge Manager explicitly stating the primary
purpose of the enhancement activity as the increas-
ing of salmon stock available to the commercial
fishery. Then there was a FWS briefing statement
that noted the CIAA’s cost-recovery harvest should
be considered a commercial fishing operation. The
Ninth Circuit, noting that the commercial fisher-
men receive an additional $1.5 million in revenue
from the project-produced fish, reached the con-
clusion that the purpose and effect of the enhance-
ment project was commercial and prohibited it
from the Refuge.
Conclusion
The Wilderness Society was entitled to summary
judgement. The enhancement project’s permit was
revoked and continued operations were prohibit-
ed.
Endnotes
1. Luke is a second-year law student at the
University of Mississippi School of Law.
2. Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
353 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003). 
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2003).
4.  Id. at § 1133(c).
5.  Id. at § 1133(a).
6. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F.Supp. 40, 42-43
(D.D.C. 1987).
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Conclusion
The district court ruled that FWS failed to meet
NEPA and MBTA requirements in its issuance of a
depredation permit to the state of Maryland for the
taking of 525 mute swans. The Court preliminarily
enjoined MDNR from further acting on its depre-
dation permit. (At the press time, according to
Dennis O’Brien, a reporter for The Baltimore Sun,
nothing has happened since this decision.)
Endnotes
1.   Shannon is a second-year law student at the
University of Georgia School of Law in Athens,
Georgia.
2.   16 U.S.C. § 703 (2003).
3.   Agencies may determine that certain actions
qualify for a “categorical exclusion” from the
requirements of NEPA if they find that the
actions do not individually or cumulatively
have a significant effect on the human environ-
ment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4; 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3
(2003).
4.   Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209,
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5.   Id. at 219.
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7.   Town of Cave Creek, Arizona v. Fed’l Aviation
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Horseplay in Bar within 
“Zone of Special Danger”
Kalama Services, Inc., et al. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 565 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Leah Huffstatler, 2L1
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently reviewed an administra-
tive decision which compensated an off-duty
employee for injuries suffered during
horseplay in a bar on a small Pacific
a to l l .  Ho ld ing  tha t  the  injuries
arose out of a “zone of special danger”
created by the isolation of the island
and the limited recreational opportu-
nities available there, the court found
the injuries were foreseeable and the
workers’ compensation benefits were
just.
Facts
Michael Ilaszczat was an employee of
Kalama Services on Johnston Atoll, a
United States possession located in
the Pacific Ocean about 700 miles
west - southwest  o f  Hawai i .  The
atoll is only two miles long and one-
half mile wide and is used by the U.S.
military to store and dispose of chemical,
nuclear and other toxic weapons. Due to the
isolated nature of the island and its military
use, certain standards of conduct govern inhab-
itants of the atoll at all times, including prohi-
bitions of gambling and fighting. 
On July 25, 1999, Ilaszczat was off-duty and
socializing at the AMVETS, one of several
authorized social clubs on the atoll when he
sustained an injury to his hip which caused
him to be permanently partially disabled.
While the injury itself is undisputed, there are
conflicting accounts of  how it  occurred.
According to Ilaszczat, after a discussion with
Private Clyde Burum regarding whether or not
Burum could put his leg over the six-foot tall
Ilaszczat’s head without touching him, the two
men agreed to a $100 wager on the demonstra-
tion. Burum, in fact, could not perform this act
and Ilaszczat walked away only to fall to the
floor after either having his foot swept out from
under him or being kicked. 
Burum’s account differed in that he claimed
Ilaszczat sustained his injury when he charged
at Burum immediately after the demonstration,
lost his balance and then fell to the ground. The
administrative law judge deciding the claim
found Ilaszczat’s version of the story to be more
credible. 
As a result of his fall, Ilaszczat broke his
hip, was hospitalized and underwent surgery.
While recovering from the surgery, he was
barred from Johnston Atoll by the military
commander and prohibited from ever returning
as a result of the physical altercation that took
place at the AMVETS. Since he could not
return to the island, Kalama Services terminat-
ed his employment. 
Ilaszczat filed a claim for worker’s compen-
sation benefits under the Longshore and
Aerial view of Johnston Atoll
Courtesy of USFWS, Photograph by Gerald Ludwig
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. At trial,
the judge found that Ilaszczat had established a
sufficient nexus between his injury and his
employment under the “zone of special danger”
doctrine to be awarded disability benefits. The
decision was affirmed by the Benefits Review
Board and Kalama sought a petition for review
from the Ninth Circuit.
Holding and Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held that the Benefits
Review Board committed no error in affirming
the administrative law judge’s decision.2 The
court agreed that the “zone of special danger” -
the limited recreational opportunities of the
small atoll coupled with the presence of social
clubs serving alcohol to employees experienc-
ing lengthy periods of isolation — creates a
foreseeable risk that horseplay might occur
from time to time and that this risk is incident
to one’s employment on the atoll.3
Endnotes
1. Leah is a second-year law student at the
University of Mississippi School of Law.
2. Kalama Services, Inc., et al. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 565 at *15 (9th Cir. 2004). 
3. Id.
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Condemnation of specific rivers that clearly
support recreational boating for most of the year
would alleviate the problem of opening up
rivers with too low of a flow rate to support
recreational boating.
Further measures could be instated to ensure
that boaters only had access to appropriate
waterways. Classifications by depth and width
of the waterway as well as cubic feet per second
flow could control which rivers were open to
boaters. Also, distinctions could be made
regarding non-impacting uses versus impacting
uses. Non-impact uses would include recre-
ational boating and possibly catch and release
fishing. Impacting uses would include
non-catch and release fishing, commercial
activities, and other activities that would
deplete the resources of the waterway.
Recreational boaters should be allowed
down non-navigable rivers because the
rivers are an important natural resource
that should be available to the public, not
just the adjacent land owners. The owners
of the adjacent land do not actually own
the water in the river, they own the bed of
the stream. This ownership should not be
enough to preclude boaters from passing
over the streambed any more than air-
planes should be barred from passing over
private land. 
The idea that property rights are
absolute is obsolete. The laws of our state
regarding public rights to rivers are based on
common law from two centuries ago as well as
the archaic views of feudal property. It is clear
that the interests that need to be protected have
changed. In order to better serve the citizens of
the State of Georgia, the legislature should
amend its laws regarding non-navigable rivers in
order to unlock the natural resources that the cit-
izens of Georgia value and have a right to use. 
Endnotes
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-8-2 (2003).
2. Id. at § 44-8-5(a).
3.  Givens, 493 S.E. 2d at 712. 
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Chattahoochee River
Courtesy of the National Park Service
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operated by the federal government through the
Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau), and the State
Water Project (SWP), operated by the State of
California via the state Department of Water
Resources (Department). Both projects draw
water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
(Delta) and deliver it to water users on a contract
basis. 
Due to rising concerns over increasing levels of
fish kills in the CVP and SWP pumping stations
in the late 1980s, the National Marine Fisheries
Services (NMFS)initiated an Endangered Species
Act (ESA) consultation with the Bureau and the
Department in 1991. On February 3, 1992, the
Bureau closed the Delta Cross Channel gates, the
gates which divert the water from the Sacramento
River toward the pumping stations, to protect the
out-migration of the juvenile salmon. A Biological
Opinion (BO) issued by NMFS on February 14,
1992 formally recommended that the gates remain
closed. Fish kills continued to increase and in May
1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
issued another BO instructing the SWP pumping
plant to reduce pumping “when large numbers of
larval and juvenile delta smelt appear at the
Federal and State fish screens.”2
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,
Kern County Water Agency, Hansen Ranches, Lost
Hills Water District, and Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa
Water Storage District (Plaintiffs) were entitled to
two categories of water under their contracts with
the Bureau and the Department. The plaintiffs
were entitled to an annual entitlement, called
“Table A water,” and, when available, Article
21 water. Article 21 water is basically surplus
water - “water in excess of the amount required to
meet the needs of the water project.”3 Due
to the pumping curtailments imposed by
the federal agencies, the plaintiffs were
deprived of water deliveries required under
their contracts. 
The plaintiffs filed suit under the Fifth
Amendment, arguing that the government
took their property without compensation.
In 2001, the Court agreed, holding that
while the federal government could reduce
water deliveries to protect endangered
species, water users were entitled to com-
pensation for any water lost under their
contracts. A separate trial was scheduled
regarding damages, in which the plaintiffs
sought compensation in the amount of
$65,697,866.
Amount of Water Lost
Before the court could determine the
total amount of water lost, it had to estab-
lish when the governmental takings com-
menced. The plaintiffs argued that the fed-
eral government’s liability attached on
February 3, 1992, the day the Delta Cross
Channel gates were closed. The court dis-
agreed. Prior to the issuance of the first BO
on February 14, 1992, the Department’s
role was voluntary. While the court recog-
nized that the gates were closed in anticipation of
a federal directive, the gate closure on February 3
was not actually compelled by a federal mandate
pursuant to the ESA. Therefore, the 23,251 acre-
Tulare Lake, from page 1
Salmon jumping
Courtesy of USFWS, Photograph by Gary Kramer
feet of water lost before the February 14, 1992 BO
was not the subject of a Fifth Amendment taking.
The February BO, however, was sufficient to
confer liability on the United States. Although the
BO did not explicitly mandate a gate closure, one
of NMFS’ reasonable and prudent alternatives rec-
ommended that the Delta Cross Channel gates
remain in the closed position from February 1
through May 1. This recommendation was essen-
tially an endorsement of the actions taken by the
Bureau and the Department. While the federal
government is not responsible for actions taken by
states on their own accord, it cannot “avoid respon-
sibility for measures that, though initially imple-
mented by the state, are nonetheless subsequently
incorporated into the federal government’s ecolog-
ical and hydrological regime.”4
Beginning in April 1992, therefore, any losses
of contractual water deliveries were compensable.
The court determined that the plaintiffs lost
114,635 acre-feet of Table A water in April 1992
and 120,892 acre-feet in 1994. The court also deter-
mined that the plaintiffs lost an additional 34,400
acre-feet of Article 21 water in 1993 and 59,967
acre-feet in 1994. In general, the “surplus” Article
21 water is allocated to contractors when (1) the
San Luis Reservoir is full, (2) the contractor’s
Table A allocations are otherwise being met, and
(3) sufficient water exists to meet state water qual-
ity standards.5 The court found that these condi-
tions were met in 1993 and in early 1994. Absent
the pumping curtailments imposed under the
ESA, the plaintiffs would have received Article 21
water in 1993 and 1994.
Value of the Water Taken
The plaintiffs were entitled to the fair market
value (FMV) of the water lost. The court ruled that
the FMV of the Table A water should be calculated
based upon the prices of the Drought Water Bank
during the years in question. The Drought Water
Bank is a program established by the Governor of
California and administered by the Department
which obtains water from sellers north of the Delta
for sale to water users in the south. The court held
that the prices charged by the Drought Water
Bank “reflected the going rate for water purchases
at the relevant times.”6 The FMV of the Table A
water, and therefore the value of plaintiff ’s proper-
ty interest, was $68.38 per acre-foot for 1992 and
$66.34 per acre-foot for 1994. 
The calculation of the value of Article 21 water
was not so straightforward. Article 21 water alloca-
tions are only available during wet years or years
in which the supply of water is greater than the
demand. During such periods the Drought Water
Bank, the best indicator of market value according
to the court, is not in operation. The court, there-
fore, settled on the reasonable profit margin a sell-
er could expect to realize on a sale as the proper
value of the Article 21 water. The court endorsed
the government’s expert’s calculations, based on a
comparable sale of water by SWP, which identified
a reasonable profit margin of $3 per acre-foot.
Final Calculations
Conclusion
The Federal Court of Claims determined that the
water contractors in California, who had been
deprived of their property due to governmental
regulation under the ESA, were entitled to over
$14 million in compensation from the federal
government.
Endnotes
1. For an in-depth analysis of this decision, see Roy
A. Nowell, Jr., Government Must Compensate for
Water-Use Restrictions, WATER LOG 21:2, 4-5
(2001) available at http://www.olemiss.edu/
orgs/SGLC/21.2wateruse.htm
2. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. U.S.,
59 Fed. Cl. 246, 249-50 (2003).
3. Id. at 248.
4. Id. at 255.
5. Id. at 256.
6. Id. at 263.
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1992 82,075 $68.38 $5,612,288.50
1994  120,892 $66.34 $8,019,975.28
1993 34,400 $  3.00 $   103,200.00
1994 59,967 $  3.00 $   179,901.00
$13,915,364.78
Table A
Water
Article
21
Water
TOTAL
Yr. Amt. FMV Total
Conclusion
An agency’s obligation, pursuant to National
Standard 8 and the RFA, is merely to make a rea-
sonable good faith effort to address comments and
alternatives provided by affected parties. It is not
required to assess every element of a plan sepa-
rately. Additionally, the consultation requirement
of the Atlantic Coastal Act was seemingly quali-
fied by “unless there is no reason to think that
consultation would have produced a different
result.”6
Endnotes
1. Terrell is a student at Roger Williams School
of Law in Bristol, Rhode Island, and is pursu-
ing a Masters in Marine Affairs at the University
of Rhode Island.
2. Little Bay Lobster Co. v. Evans, 352 F.3d 462, 468
(1st Cir. 2003).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
4. Id. at § 1851(a)(4). 
5. Id. at § 1851(a)(8).
6. Little Bay, 352 F.3d at 468.
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to draft removal protocols, in consultation with
the  Commiss ion  and  o ther  exper t s :  “ The
Department of Fish and Wildlife, Northwest
Straits Commission, the Department of Natural
Resources, and other interested parties, must pub-
lish guidelines for the safe removal and disposal of
derelict fishing gear . . . by August 31, 2002.”11
More importantly the statute provided that,
“derelict fishing gear removal conducted in accor-
dance with the guidelines prepared in subsection
(2) of this section is not subject to permitting under
RCW 77.55.100.”12
The way was clear: the self-imposed barriers
to a real recovery effort were soon replaced with a
practical, safe methodology for accomplishing the
work. A technical team of experts representing a
variety of state and federal agencies, divers, pri-
vate individuals and tribal interests was convened
and drafted guidelines for the safe removal and
disposal of derelict fishing gear. They were tested
in the water and modified, then made official and
published. Throughout this technical process, the
Commission kept legislators, state agency heads,
and the fourth estate involved: ultimately a ‘VIP
Vessel’ filled with such luminaries attended the
first official net recovery, which was carried on
National Public Radio and made national news. 
Since that start, commercial divers and vessels
trained in the new protocols – exempted from per-
mitting delays  – have been at work. They analyze
hazards with sidescan sonar and videography to
reduce risks, then divers physically remove the
gear from the waters of the Northwest Straits,
under surface gases. 
During the first year of the pilot effort four-
teen state and federal agencies and other organi-
zations partnered onto the project. In September
of 2003, the project participants were awarded the
prestigious 2003 Coastal America Partnership
Award.13 The Governor has even visited the team
at work, and the budget for gear removal has
tripled, thanks to those additional sponsors.
They will need it; that new project database
now contains over 160 locations of known derelict
nets in Puget Sound.
Endnotes
1.   Monofilament lasts up to 500 years. Chas.
Moore, Trashed, NATURAL HISTORY, v.112, n. 9
(Nov. 2003).
2.   The term ‘ghost nets’ is objectionable to many
fishermen, and this project avoids its use in
program materials.
3.   ESA listing: 50 CFR parts 223, 224; 64 Fed.
Reg. 14327 (March 8, 1999).
4.   Title IV, H.R. 3461 (105th Cong., 2nd Sess.).
5.   Grant award: NOAA/NMFS CRP Grant.
6.   The Guidelines can be downloaded at
http://www.nwstraits.org/derelict_gear .
7.   WASH. REV. CODE § 77.55 (emphasis added).
8.    Id. at § 77.12(2).
9.   Reporting Hotline: 1-800-477-6224.
10. Report online: www.wdfw.wa.gov/fish/derelict/ .
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 77.12 (2) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at § 77.12(3) (emphasis added).
13. The award announcement can be viewed at
www.coastalamerica.gov/text/awards .
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In November 1994, Tropical Storm Gordon
stalled over the Florida Keys, wreaking havoc on
land and at sea. On the evening of November 14,
the tug J.A. Orgeron, adrift near Bethel Shoal
near Fort Pierce, Florida after experiencing
engine problems, signaled the Coast Guard for
assistance. When Skip Strong, captain of the
688-foot oil-tanker Cherry Valley, answered the
Orgeron’s distress call he had no way of knowing
that he was about to make maritime salvage his-
tory by saving the $50 million external fuel tank
of the space shuttle Atlantis.
The story behind the rescue of the J.A.
Orgeron and the barge Poseidon, which carried
NASA’s external fuel tank, and the subsequent
salvage claim by the owner and crew of the
Cherry Valley springs to life in the capable hands
o f  Sk ip  S t rong  and  Twain  Braden .
Unfortunately, after catching the reader’s atten-
tion quickly with a tense pre-trial scene, the first
fifty pages of In Peril bogs down with an extraor-
dinary amount of space devoted to the construc-
tion of the external fuel tank and the logistics of
towing it from Louisiana to Cape Canaveral,
which did not seem all that relevant to the res-
cue itself. In Peril, however, regains its momen-
tum in Part II and quickly carries the reader
along to its historic conclusion. 
Although the authors assume a high level of
familiarity with nautical terms and references,
In Peril, with its simple style and attention to
detail, places the reader right in the middle of
the action. The engineers on the Cherry Valley
operate at a frantic pace, the third mate is sta-
tioned in the chartroom ensuring that the Cherry
Valley does not run aground on Bethel Shoal, and
the captains of the Cherry Valley and the J.A.
Orgeron attempt to attach lines without endan-
gering their vessels and men while struggling
with the darkness, wind, and waves. 
The story of the rescue is exciting enough,
but the events that take place once the vessels
are safe and the attorneys get involved are fasci-
nating. Keystone Shipping Company sought sal-
vage rights from the owner of the J.A. Orgeron
and NASA. Despite the fact that the crew of the
Cherry Valley saved NASA upwards of $50 mil-
lion, the federal government vigorously fought
the salvage award. In the end, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals awarded Keystone $4.125 mil-
lion – the largest maritime salvage award in U.S.
history. The crew received $1,752,642, what
remained after paying interest, costs, and
Keystone’s 63 percent share.
In Peril contains eight pages of photographs,
illustrations, and maps, including nautical
charts identifying the position of the Cherry
Valley and the Orgeron during the rescue and
tow. One page of diagrams detailing the actual
rescue is especially helpful for landlubbers
unable to visualize the rescue maneuvers from
words alone. Thoroughly enjoyable, In Peril is
an excellent selection for adrenaline junkies,
history buffs, maritime lawyers, and for anyone
curious about what really goes on during daring
sea rescues.
Book Review . . . 
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
In Peril: A Daring Decision, 
a Captain’s Resolve, 
and the Salvage that Made History
Skip Strong and Twain Braden (Lyons Press 2003)
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Book Review . . .
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
Coastal State Regulation of
International Shipping
Lindy S. Johnson (Oceana 2004)
International shipping poses a significant risk to
the world’s oceans and its resources. Think Exxon
Valdez or the Prestige. Recognizing this threat, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
its member states have over the years adopted con-
ventions to protect the marine environment, most
recently with regard to invasive species and ballast
water. While these international guidelines are
extremely important, some environmental prob-
lems cry out for a local solution. In Coastal State
Regulation of International Shipping, Lindy Johnson
examines the conflicts that arise under the 1982
U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)
between a coastal state’s interest in regulating nav-
igation to prevent harm to marine resources and
the interest of the shipping industry in remaining
free from burdensome regulations. 
The authority of a coastal state to prescribe and
enforce laws varies among maritime zones. Johnson
discusses the options available to coastal states
within the maritime zones of the port, the territori-
al sea, the contiguous zone, and the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. In general, coastal state authority
diminishes as a ship moves away from the coast.
For example, a coastal state may take action within
its territorial sea to protect its vital interest of sov-
ereignty and security, but states only have sover-
eign rights in the EEZ for the purposes of explor-
ing, exploiting, conserving, and managing EEZ
resources and the economic exploitation and explo-
ration of the EEZ. To illustrate the challenges of
prescribing and enforcing domestic laws, as
opposed to international rules and standards,
Johnson highlights recent actions taken by coastal
states, such as the United States and Canada, to
address ship strikes of right whales, the unwanted
transfer of harmful aquatic organisms through bal-
last water discharges, and waste water discharges
from cruise ships. Johnston also presents case stud-
ies of the adoption of a no-anchoring prohibition
for Flower Garden Banks National Marine
Sanctuary and the single-hull tanker restrictions
issued in the wake of the Prestige oil spill.
Coastal State Regulation is not written for a gen-
eral audience nor is it an introductory text on the
Law of the Sea or IMO regulation of international
shipping. Readers unfamiliar with UNCLOS may
have a difficult time grasping many aspects of
Johnson’s analysis. Coastal State Regulation is a text
for scholars, attorneys, and other professionals
involved with international shipping and environ-
mental policy. Johnson clearly identifies issues that
coastal states and policy-makers must be aware of
when attempting to regulate international ship-
ping for environment reasons, such as impacts on
navigation and enforcement capabilities, and offers
several recommendations. In addition, Coastal
State Regulation’s annexes contain essential refer-
ence material, including the text of pertinent
UNCLOS articles, a chronological list of ratifica-
tions and accessions, and excerpts of declarations
made by states pertaining to the protection of the
marine environment and navigation. Coastal State
Regulation is a valuable addition to the field.
Coastal State Regulation is the result of Johnson’s
experience as an attorney with NOAA General
Counsel’s Office of International Law. She is pri-
marily responsible for land- and sea-based sources
of marine pollution, marine protected areas, and
ship strikes of right whales. The views expressed,
however, are those of the author and do no necessar-
ily represent the views of the U.S. Government, the
Department of Commerce, and NOAA. Coastal
State  Regulat ion i s  avai lable  f rom Oceana
Publications at http://www.oceanalaw.com .
Photo courtesy of NOAA’s Alaska Fisheries Science Center
The California Court of Appeals recently blocked an attempt by the fishing industry to re-open the no-
fishing zones around the Channel Islands. The 175-square mile network of marine reserves was created in
2002 to allow endangered white abalone and other species to recover from years of overfishing. The
industry argued that they “have an absolute right to fish” in public waters. The court ruled that fisher-
men have no constitutional right to destroy or deplete fish in a preserve or marine sanctuary. 
Have you always wanted to fish for salmon in Alaska, but shied away because you
were too busy to spend a whole season on a commercial boat? Now may be your
chance. A bill has been introduced in Alaska that would allow tourists to purchase
a one-day commercial fishing license for $30. This idea, similar to “dude” ranch-
ing, would allow commercial fishermen to provide tourists with a hands-on expe-
rience. While tourists are currently allowed on commercial boats, they may not
participate unless they purchase a crew license costing $60 for residents and $180
for non-residents. The only question remains, if the bill passes, will rugged com-
mercial fishermen actually allow tourists on their boats?
Around the Globe
In February, the International Maritime Organization adopted the “International
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and
Sediments” to address and hopefully prevent the spread of harmful aquatic organ-
isms via ballast water. The Convention requires all ships to prepare and imple-
ment a Ballast Water and Sediment Management Plan and carry a Ballast Water Record Book. There are
also requirements for research and monitoring and certification and inspection. The mandatory regula-
tions will be phased in over a period of years, starting in 2009. The Conference was attended by represen-
tatives from 74 states and the Convention will come into force 12 months after ratification by 30 states
representing 35 percent of world merchant shipping tonnage. For more information, visit the IMO’s web-
site at http://www.imo.org . 
On March 12, 2004, an Australian Federal
Court judge ruled that the seizure of a vessel
illegally fishing in the Southern Ocean was law-
ful. The owners of the Volga, a Russian-flagged
ship confiscated in February 2002 for illegally
fishing for Patagonian toothfish, had appealed
the seizure of the vessel. Australia’s Fisheries
Minister praised the decision as signaling sup-
port for the government’s position that a for-
eign-flagged vessel, its equipment, and catch
are automatically forfeit if the vessel is sighted
illegally fishing in Australian waters.
Supporters hope this ruling will help curb
poaching, especially in the Antarctic. 
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Catching a Chinook Salmon in  
Alaska
Courtesy of USFWS 
Photograph by Jo Keller
Boarding the Volga
Courtesy of the Australian Royal Navy
Sea Grant Law Center
Kinard Hall, Wing E, Room 262
P.O. Box 1848
University, MS 38677-1848
THE SANDBAR
THE SANDBAR is a result of research sponsored in
part by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce,
under Grant Number NA16RG2258, the Sea
Grant Law Center, Mississippi Law Research
Institute, and University of Mississippi Law
Center. The U.S. Government and the Sea Grant
College Program are authorized to produce and
distribute reprints notwithstanding any copy-
right notation that may appear hereon. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of
NOAA or any of its sub-agencies. Graphics by
©Corel Gallery, © Nova Development Corp.,
NOAA, USFWS, National Park Service  and
U.S. EPA.
The University of Mississippi
complies with all applicable laws
regarding affirmative action and
equal opportunity in all its activi-
ties and programs and does not
discriminate against anyone pro-
tected by law because of age, creed,
color, national origin, race, religion, sex, handicap, veter-
an or other status.
MASGP 04-004-01
This publication is printed on recycled paper.
April, 2004
Editor: Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
Publication Design: Waurene Roberson
Research Associates: 
T.B. Boardman, Jr., 3L 
Tripp Bridges, 3L
Leah Huffstatler, 2L
Shannon McGhee, 2L
Luke Miller,  2L
Contributors: 
Gary Wood, Northwest Straits Commission
THE SANDBAR is a quar-
terly publication reporting
on legal issues affecting
the U.S. oceans and coasts.
I t s  goa l  i s  to  increase
awareness  and under-
standing of coastal prob-
lems and issues. To sub-
scribe to THE SANDBAR,
contact: the Sea Grant Law
Center, Kinard Hall, Wing E, Room 262, P.O. Box 1848,
University, MS, 38677-1848, phone: (662) 915-7775, or
contact us via e-mail at: sealaw@olemiss.edu . We wel-
come suggestions for topics you would like to see cov-
ered in THE SANDBAR.
